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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
KENNY JIM SHAW,
Plaintiff/Appellant
vs.
LAYTON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
INC., a Utah corporation, STEEL
DECK ERECTORS, INC., a Utah
corporation, and JOHN DOES A to Z,

Case No. 930475-CA

Defendants/Appellees
LAYTON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC.,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.
BILT-RITE CONCRETE, INC., a
Nevada corporation; I. CHRISTENSEN,
INC., a Nevada corporation or
partnership; HARV & HIGHAM MASONRY,
a Utah corporation; and TECH STEEL,
a Utah corporation,
Third-Party Defendants.
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLEE STEEL DECK ERECTORS, INC.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to
Article VIII § 3 of the Utah Constitution; Utah Code Annotated §
78-2-2(3)(j) (as amended); and Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED AND THE STANDARD OF
APPELLATE REVIEW
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Whether the trial court erred in concluding as a

matter of law that the law of Nevada rather than the law of Utah
applies to this case and exempts those in the same employ from
liability for the injuries Plaintiff Shaw received while working
for a Utah based subcontractor which was performing a job for the
State of Nevada in the state of Nevada.
2.

Whether the trial court erred in concluding as a

matter of law that lex loci delicti was the correct choice of law
rule to apply to this case.
3.

Whether the trial court erred in concluding as a

matter of law that Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-62 does not always apply
extraterritorially to Utah residents who are injured while
working out of state.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because each issue on appeal involves only questions of
law this Court should review the trial court's ruling for
correctness.

City of Logan v. Utah Power and Light Co.. 796 P.2d

697 (Utah 1990).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
1.

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 616.560 (1986)
(Attached as Exhibit MA,f)

2.

Nev. Rev. Stat. S 616.085 (Supp. 1989)
(Attached as Exhibit "B")

3.

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 616.270 (1986)
(Attached as Exhibit "C")
2

4.

Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-62 (as amended)
(Attached as Exhibit "D")

5.

Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-54 (as amended)
(Attached as Exhibit "E")

6.

Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-44 (as amended)
(Attached as Exhibit "F")

7.

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 616.260 (1986)
(Attached as Exhibit "G")
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of The Case

Plaintiff/Appellant, Kenny Jim Shaw (hereinafter
"Plaintiff"), brought a negligent tort claim against
Defendant/Appellee, Layton Construction Company, Inc.
(hereinafter "Layton"); Defendant/Appellee Steel Deck Erectors,
Inc. (hereinafter "Steel Deck"); Defendant Bilt-Rite Concrete
(hereinafter "Bilt-Rite:); and John Does A to Z (hereinafter
collectively referred to as "John Does") for injuries he claims
to have received while working on the construction site of the
Nevada State Prison in Ely, Nevada.

Plaintiff's Complaint

contained causes of action against all Defendants for negligence,
res ipsa loquitur, and negligence per se.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below:

Defendants Layton and Steel Deck were served with
Plaintiff's Complaint.

Plaintiff, however, has not yet served

Defendant Bilt-Rite or any John Does.

Steel Deck answered

Plaintiff's Complaint asserting various affirmative defenses
including immunity from liability from this type of action

3

provided by the laws of Nevada.

Layton also answered Plaintiff's

Complaint and filed Third Party Complaints against Bilt-Rite; I.
Christensen, Inc.; Harv & Higham Masonry, Inc.; and Tech Steel,
Inc.

Layton subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's

Complaint and Steel Deck filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.
Both Motions argued that Nevada law governed Plaintiff's cause of
action and granted them immunity from his tort claim.

Memoranda

were submitted, the Motions were orally argued and on November
26, 1991, Judge Pat Brian granted both Motions and dismissed
Plaintiff's Complaint against both Defendants.
Plaintiff appealed Judge Brian's dismissal of his
Complaint.

This Court, however, on its own Motion, dismissed

Plaintiff's Appeal for lack of jurisdiction due to Plaintiff's
failure to obtain a Certification of Finality from the trial
court pursuant to Rule 54(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

See

Shaw v. Layton Construction Co.. 215 Utah Adv. Rep. 36 (Utah
Ct.App. 1993).

Following dismissal of that appeal (Case No.

920025-CA) the parties appeared before Judge Brian and on July 8,
1993 obtained a Rule 54(b) Certification of Finality from the
trial court.

Notice of Appeal was filed on July 20, 1993, and

this matter is again before this Court for a determination of the
issues involved in the first appeal.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Layton, a general contractor from Utah, entered into a
contract with the State of Nevada to construct "Phase II" of a
maximum security prison in Ely, Nevada (hereinafter "the Nevada
4

Project"). (R. 3, 13, 140, 196, and 322)

In order to construct

the Nevada Project, Layton entered into subcontracts with
subcontractors from Nevada and Utah. (R. 40, 44, 49, 55, and 106)
Those who are parties to the action which underlies this appeal
(Bilt-Rite Concrete, Inc., a Nevada corporation; I. Christensen,
Inc., a Nevada corporation; Tech Steel, Inc., a Utah corporation;
Steel Deck Erectors, Inc., a Utah corporation; and Harv & Higham
Masonry, Inc., a Utah corporation) were all subcontractors on the
Nevada Project. (R. 40, 44, 49, 55, 106, and 322)
Plaintiff was hired by Harv & Higham in July of 1989,
to work on a prison under construction in Gunnison, Utah. (R. 374
and 376-380)

Four months later, as that project neared

completion, Plaintiff voluntarily elected to go out of state and
join a Nevada Union in order to work on the Nevada Project.
Plaintiff could have continued to work for his employer, Harv &
Higham, on jobs in Salt Lake City, Orem, or Ogden, Utah. He,
however, chose to work on the Nevada Project and joined a Nevada
Union because his pay would almost double. (R. 377-379)
Plaintiff was injured on February 5, 1990, while
working on the Nevada Project. (R. 3-4, 14, 122-122, 140, 196-197
and 243)

Subsequent to his injury Plaintiff sought and received

workers' compensation pursuant to Utah law (R. 142 and 245-246)
and thereafter filed his lawsuit against Layton, Steel Deck,
Bilt-Rite and John Does claiming causes of action against those
Defendants for negligence, res ipsa loquitur, and negligence per
se. (R. 2-6A, 8-9, 12-18 and 20-22)
5

The Defendants who were

served with process successfully argued to the trial court that
Plaintiff's Complaint against them should be barred by Nevada
law, (R. 321-329) and this appeal has been taken. (R. 345-346)
SUMMARY OP THE ARGUMENT
This appeal presents a conflict of laws problem.

The

application of Nevada law to this dispute would prevent Plaintiff
from maintaining his negligence claim against these Defendants,
while the application of Utah law would not do so.

Because

Plaintiff filed suit in Utah, Utah's Choice of Law rules should
be used to decide which state's law should apply.

Utah has

consistently held that procedural matters should be decided by
the laws of the forum state, while issues affecting the parties7
substantive rights should be resolved by applying the lex loci
delicti or the law of the place of the wrong.

The issue on

appeal in the instant case, Plaintiff's ability to pursue a
negligent tort claim against these Defendants and Defendants'
right to be free from such a lawsuit, directly impacts the
substantive rights of the parties, and should therefore be
resolved by applying the lex loci delicti which is the law of
Nevada.

Furthermore, Utah's workers' compensation laws do not

create an exception to the choice of law rule of lex loci delicti
in this case.
If this Court concludes that lex loci delicti should
not be used to resolve conflict of law issues where workers'
compensation may be involved the result will remain the same
regardless of which choice of law analysis is used.
6

The most significant contacts approach to this choice
of law question (which looks to: the place where the injury
occurred; the place where the conduct causing the injury
occurred; the domicile, residence nationality, place of
incorporation and place of business of the parties; and the place
where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered)
leads to the conclusion that Nevada's contacts to the incident
which underlies Plaintiff's lawsuit are greater than Utah's
contacts.

The injury occurred in Nevada; the allegedly negligent

conduct occurred in Nevada; some of the parties to this lawsuit
are Utah residents and corporations, others have Nevada domiciles
but at the time of Plaintiff's injuries all were doing business
in Nevada; and the relationship between the parties was centered
entirely in Nevada.
Using an interest analysis to resolve the choice of law
problem presented by this appeal also dictates that Nevada law
should govern this action.

Utah has a valid and legitimate

interest in seeing that its citizens receive compensation for
work related injuries.

Plaintiff has been compensated pursuant

to the workers' compensation laws of Utah and has various avenues
to augment that award if it is insufficient to adequately
compensate him for his injuries.

Utah, however, has an even

greater interest in ensuring its citizens, subcontractors, and
general contractors can continue to seek and receive out of state
work on an equal basis with citizens, subcontractors and general
contractors from other states. If Nevada law is found to apply to
7

the instant case citizens and companies who are residents of Utah
could continue to compete for out of state work on an equal basis
with the residents of other states.

Conversely, if Utah law is

applied to this dispute, Utah citizens permitted to work on an
out of state project as employees, subcontractors or general
contractors would expose all others on the same job site to the
risk of a lawsuit for negligence in the courts of this state.
That risk would end up being eliminated by the systematic
exclusion of Utah citizens and companies from out of state
projects.
A balancing of only Utah's interests dictates that
Nevada law should govern this dispute.

An interest analysis

approach to choice of law questions, however, requires the
interests of both jurisdictions to be considered.
is the owner of the Nevada Project.
defendant.

Nevada was and

Nevada is also a potential

Nevada has an obvious and legitimate interest in

having its own law govern disputes involving a job it
commissioned to be completed within its borders.

Nevada also has

an interest in protecting individuals working within its borders
and in ensuring that resident corporations and others doing
business within the state will be protected from third party
liability for negligence where workers' compensation is involved.
The interests of both Utah and Nevada favor the application of
Nevada law to this dispute.

8

ARGUMENT
I.
THE CHOICE OF LAW RULE TRADITIONALLY ADHERED
TO IN UTAH OF LEX LOCI DELICTI SHOULD BE USED
TO DETERMINE WHICH STATE'S LAW SHOULD GOVERN
TBtg PISPUTE
Plaintiff, a Utah Resident, filed a tort claim in the
Third Judicial District Court for the State of Utah seeking to
recover for injuries he received while working on a construction
project in the state of Nevada for the State of Nevada.

If Utah

law governs Plaintiff's Complaint, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 35-1-62 (1953 as amended), he could maintain his negligence
claim against the Defendants named in his Complaint as well as
others.

If, however, Nevada law is found to govern this action,

Plaintiff's Complaint against those in the same employ which
includes the general contractor, the subcontractors and all of
their employees, would be barred pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. §§
616.560 (1986), 616.270 (1986), 616.085 (Supp. 1989) and 616.116
(1986).

This Court must decide which State's law should govern

Plaintiff's Complaint.
When faced with a conflict of laws, the forum court
should apply its own choice of law rules to determine the outcome
of the conflict.

Klaxon v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co.. 313 U. S.

487, 491 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.E.D. 1477 (1941).

Since, Utah is

the forum for this controversy its choice of law rules should be
used to decide this issue.

In Utah, conflicts over procedural

matters are governed by the law of the forum while conflicts over
parties' substantive rights are resolved by applying the
9

traditional rule of lex loci delicti or the law of the place of
the wrong.

Buhler v. Maddison. 176 P.2d 118, 122 (Utah 1947).

See also 168 A.L.R. 177; and 16 Am.Jur.2d. Conflicts of Law § 5,
98, 99 and 118.
This Court referred to the procedural/substantive
characterization of conflicts questions in Rhoades v. Wright, 622
P.2d 343, 348-49 (Utah 1980).

In order to resolve the matter at

hand, the conflict between Utah and Nevada law should first be
classified as procedural or substantive.

Procedural matters are

those dealing with the conduct of the litigation; the machinery
for carrying on the suit including pleading, process, evidence
and practice, June v. Erie R.R. Co., 140 N.E. 366 (Ohio 1922); or
the mode by which a legal right is enforced.

Bohme v. Southern

Pacific Co.. 8 Cal. App. 3d 291, 87 Cal.Rptr. 286 (Cal.App.2d
1970).

Substantive matters, on the other hand, involve the

creation, definition and regulation of individuals' rights and
duties.

Sohm v. Bernstien. 279 A.2d 529 (Maine 1971).
The conflict in this case involves Plaintiff's right to

maintain a cause of action in Utah for an injury he received
while working in Nevada and the Defendants7 right to be free from
such a lawsuit.

The conflict at hand directly affects the

parties' substantive rights. A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's
Compensation. (1990) § 88.21, 16-193.

In the opening paragraph

of the argument section of Plaintiff's Brief, Plaintiff
acknowledges that the conflict in question "bears upon the
substantive rights of this state's [sic] residents..." including
10

Plaintiff. (Plaintiff's Brief at 10)

Therefore, according to the

choice of law rule traditionally followed in Utah, the rule of
lex loci delicti, the substantive law of the place of the wrong
should govern actions based on that wrong.

Bodrua v. United

States of Am. and F.A.A.. 832 F.2d 136, 137 (10th Cir. 1987);
citing Madison v. Deseret Livestock Co.. 574 F.2d 1027, 1032
(10th Cir. 1978); Jackson v. Continental Bank & Trust Co.. 443
F.2d 1344, 1349 n. 6 (10th Cir. 1979); Valesquez v. Greyhound
Line. Inc.. 12 Utah 2d 379, 366 P.2d 989, 991 (1961), overruled
on other grounds; Harris v. Utah Transit Auth.. 672 P.2d 217
(Utah 1983); and Hudson v. Decker. 7 Utah 2d 24, 317 P.2d 594,
595 (1957).
The purpose of the rule of lex loci delicti is, and
always has been, to promote stability in the law, predictability
of result, justice among the parties and to prevent the scourge
of forum shopping.
and 118.

16 Am.Jur.2d Conflicts of Law §§ 5, 98, 99

See also Northeast Utilities. Inc. v. Pittman Trucking

Co.. 595 So.2d 1351, 1353 (Ala. 1992) and (VConner v. O'Conner.
519 A.2d 13 (Conn. 1986).

The case at hand is an ideal situation

to apply the choice of law rule of lex loci delicti and promote
the above values.
In some situations where the traditional tort choice of
law rule of lex loci delicti has been rejected (in cases dealing
with automobile guest statutes or interspousal immunity) the
courts have focused on the fortuitousness of the place of the
injury.

See Forsman v. Forsman. 779 P.2d 218, 219-220 (Utah
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1989).

But see Wood v. Tavlor. 332 P.2d 215, 216 (Utah 1958);

and Hudson. 317 P.2d. at 594-595.
the converse is true.

In the instant case, however,

The fortuitous facts surrounding this

dispute are the parties' domiciles.

See LaBounty v. American

Insurance Co., 451 A.2d 161, 163 (N.H. 1982), and Clark v. Clark,
222 A.2d 205, 208 (N.H. 1966).

The owner of the Nevada Project,

the State of Nevada, was certain and known to all.

The job site

of Ely, Nevada was also permanent, continual, open, obvious and
known to all involved.

The domiciles of the general contractor,

the subcontractors (all licensed to do construction work in the
state of Nevada) and the individual employees (many of whom like
Plaintiff were members of Nevada unions), however, were
undisclosed and unknown to the others.

The record does not

indicate how many subcontractors or individual employees were
Nevada residents.

Two Nevada corporations are currently parties

to this lawsuit and in light of the size of the Nevada Project,
its owner and its location there are likely to be many others
involved, including the State of Nevada.
Because of the various domiciles of the parties and
potential parties, applying Utah's law to Plaintiff's Complaint
would create confusion, uncertainty and would promote forum
shopping.

Confusion and uncertainty would result when Plaintiff

attempts to serve BiIt-Rite or any of the John Does with
domiciles other than Utah.

Plaintiff emphasizes time and time

again that the Defendants in this case are all residents of Utah.
(Plaintiff's Brief at 8, 9, 11 and 14)
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Plaintiff seems to ignore

the fact that his Complaint named a Nevada Corporation and 26
John Does as Defendants in this action and that various third
party claims have been filed against Nevada residents by Layton.
It is likely that many of those John Does (which likely includes
the State of Nevada) are residents of Nevada or other states.
The application of Utah law to Steel Deck and Layton would beg
the question what law would apply to the defendants with
domiciles other than Utah?

The application of lex loci delicti

to this case, however, would raise no such question.

It would be

certain for all and would prevent forum shopping.
Another question which would have to be addressed by
this court is which law would apply if the injured party seeking
to maintain a negligence action were not a resident of Utah?

It

is not inconceivable that one or more individuals with various
domiciles were injured while working on the Nevada Project.

If

this court applies some rule other than lex loci delicti the
question of which state's law should apply could become an issue
for injuries on this or any other out of state project where a
Utah resident, contractor or subcontractor was involved.

This

case is ideally suited to reaffirm Utah's reliance on lex loci
delicti to resolve choice of law issues in tort to promote
certainty, predictability and the effective administration of
justice.
In the case at hand "the acts alleged and complained of
[in Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint], and which give rise to
the various causes of action enumerated [therein], occurred
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exclusively within Ely, Nevada.11 (R. 2-3 and 13)

Furthermore,

the injuries for which Plaintiff seeks to recover were sustained
exclusively in Ely, Nevada. (Plaintiff's Brief at 6)
dispute that Nevada is the place of the wrong.

There is no

Therefore, unless

this Court elects to undertake a new course for choice of law in
Utah, the law of Nevada should govern the parties substantive
rights and obligations, and bar Plaintiff's Complaint against
Steel Deck.
II.
UTAH CODE ANN. SS 35-1-44(6). 35-1-54 AND 351-62 DO NOT CREATE AN EXCEPTION TO THE RULE
OF LEX LOCI DELICTI
Plaintiff argues that lex loci delicti should not apply
to the instant situation because Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-62 (1953
as amended) grants individuals entitled to workers' compensation
an action for damages against some negligent third parties, and
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-54 (1953 as amended) allows a worker, who
is hired or regularly employed in this state and is injured
during the course of his employment outside of this state, to
receive compensation according to the laws of this state.
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred when it ruled, as a
matter of law, that "Utah's Workers [sic] Compensation Act is not
applicable extraterritorily [sic] for injuries to a Utah worker
occuring [sic] outside the state of Utah." (R. 328 J 7)

While

the trial court's conclusion of law misstates the law as set
forth in Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-54, Steel Deck contends that the
trial court intended paragraph seven to read "Utah Code Ann. §
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35-1-62 of Utah/s Workers' Compensation Act is not applicable
extraterritorially for injuries to a Utah worker occurring
outside the state of Utah."

That conclusion would be the only

position consistent with the Motions and Memoranda submitted by
Defendants Layton and Steel Deck. (R. 166-172 and 257)
Nevertheless, the trial court's decision is to be reviewed for
correctness and the outcome below was correct.
Plaintiff contends that Utah's Workers' Compensation
statute was intended to have extraterritorial effect and cites
dubious cases in support of that contention.

Steel Deck agrees

that Utah's legislative scheme to compensate employees who are
injured on the job extends to employees who are injured while out
of state.

Steel Deckf however, disagrees with Plaintiff's

interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-44(6) construing the word
"benefits" to include "the right to bring a third party tort
action for injuries received by the employee while temporarily
out of state." (Plaintiff's Brief at 28)
Reading Utah Workers' Compensation Act (Utah Code Ann.
S § 35-1-1 through 35-1-107) as a whole, demonstrates the lack of
logic or reason in Plaintiff's position regarding the meaning of
"and benefits."

Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 and 35-1-50, (1953 as

Amended) provide in part that an employee injured by accident in
the course of his employment, regardless of where it occurs,
"shall be paid compensation for loss sustained on account of the
injury . . . and such amount for medical, nurse, and hospital
services and medicines . . . as provided in this chapter."
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Steel

Deck contends that the payments for "medical, nurse, and hospital
services, and for medicines, and [] such artificial means and
appliances necessary to treat the patient" provided for in Utah
Code Ann. § 35-1-81 (1953 as amended), in addition to
compensation, are the "benefits" referred to in § 35-1-44(6).
Plaintiffs interpretation of "payments and benefits" is further
undermined by the legislature's use of: the phrase "Workers7
Compensation Benefits" in Utah Code Ann. § S 35-1-46(1), (2) and
35-1-46.10 through .30; "compensation or other benefits in lieu
of the compensation and other benefits provided by this title" in
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-52; and "the employee's claim for benefits
under this chapter is wholly barred" if not brought within 180
days in Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-99.

(emphasis added)

Using the

term "benefits" to include an injured employee's right to sue
negligent third parties would arguably create a 180 day statute
of limitations on such actions.
Plaintiff's contention that an individual's right to
maintain a negligence action against third parties is a benefit
of Utah's Workers' Compensation Act which should apply
extraterritorially is not supported by statute, nor case law and
is contrary to the legislature's intent.

The language of this

State's workers' compensation law fails to provide a basis for
this Court to reject the long standing doctrine of lex loci
delicti for resolving choice of law issues in negligence actions
even where workers' compensation is involved.
Williams, 764 F.2d 1180, 1182-1183 (5th Cir.).
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See Dueitt v.

III.
NEVADA LAW SHOULD BE POUND TO GOVERN PLAINTIFF'S
COMPLAINT WHETHER THE CONFLICT OF LAWS PRESENTED BY
THIS APPEAL IS RESOLVED BY APPLYING A "MOST SIGNIFICANT
CONTACTS" APPROACH: AN "INTEREST ANALYSIS"APPROACH: OR
A COMBINATION OF THOSE APPROACHES
Plaintiff's brief urges this Court to reject the choice
of law rule of lex loci delicti for this case and argues for the
adoption of a different choice of law rule for workers'
compensation matters.

The standard being advocated appears to be

a combination of a "most significant contacts" test and an
"interest analysis" test.

If this court elects to choose a

specialized choice of law rule to govern cases involving
conflicts of law in workers' compensation matters Nevada law
should still be found to govern the instant case.
A.
Nevada's Relation to the Occurrence is
Greater than Utah's Connection, and Nevada Law
Should be Found to Govern this Dispute if a "Most
Significant Contacts" Test is Used to Resolve This
Conflict of Law
The "most significant contacts" test expounded in
Restatement (Second) Conflicts of Law § 145 states:
(1) The rights and liabilities of the
parties with respect to an issue in tort are
determined by the local law of the state
which, as to that issue, has the most
significant relationship to the occurrence
and the parties under the principles stated
in § 6.
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in
applying the principles of § 6 to determine
the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred;
(b) the place where the conduct causing
the injury occurred;
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(c) the domicile, residence,
nationality, place of incorporation and
place of business of the parties; and
(d) the place where the relationship, if
any, between the parties is centered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according
to their relative importance with respect to
the particular issue.
i.

The Injuries Sustained by Plaintiff were
Sustained in Nevada

The injury which underlies Plaintiff's lawsuit occurred
in Nevada. (R. 2-4 and 12-14).

In Barrinaer v. State. 727 P.2d

1222, 1227 (Idaho 1986) the Idaho Supreme Court, in a case
dealing with a conflict of laws in the workers7 compensation
context, held that "of the contacts to be considered, 'none has a
more significant relationship to the issue . . . than . . . the
place of the injury." Id. quoting Johnson v. Pischke. 700 P.2d
19, 24 (Idaho 1985).

The Nevada Supreme Court has also

recognized the primacy of the place of the injury in resolving
choice of law questions arising in the context of workers'
compensation.

Tab Construction Co. v. Eighth Judicial District

Court. 432 P.2d 90 (Nev. 1967);

See also Northeast Utilities.

595 A.2d at 1353.
There is no question that the place of the injury which
underlies Plaintiff's Complaint was Nevada and that that contact
favors the application of Nevada law to this dispute.
ii.

The Conduct Causing Plaintiff's Injuries
Occurred Exclusively in Nevada

Plaintiff alleges that his injuries resulted from
Defendants' negligence in failing to make safe a hole in tin
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decking material at the Nevada Project. (R. 4-6 and 14-17)

He

also contends that "[t]he acts . . . which give rise to the
various causes of action enumerated [in his Complaint] occurred
exclusively within Ely, Nevada." (R. 2-3 and 13)

Each

jurisdiction has an interest in protecting those within its
boundaries from injuries due to negligent conduct and in
regulating such conduct.

See Wood. 332 P.2d at 216-217; and

Hudson, 317 P.2d at 595.

Because the conduct involved in the

incident which underlies this action occurred exclusively in Ely,
Nevada, that contact also favors the application of Nevada law to
this case.
iii. While the Parties to this Appeal May All be
Residents of Utah Some Unserved Defendants
and Third Party Defendants are Residents of
Nevada
Plaintiff, Steel Deck and Layton are all Utah
residents.

Bilt-Rite, I Christensen and the State of Nevada,

however, are not residents of this State.

Those with Utah

domiciles could reasonably foresee a visit to a Utah courtroom,
but not for a personal injury action arising from alleged
negligent conduct performed in Nevada which allegedly caused
injuries in Nevada, on a construction project in Nevada which had
been commissioned, directed and was owned by the State of Nevada.
An important aspect of this factor is the place of
business of the parties.

In the instant action all of those

involved, parties and potential parties, were doing business in
Nevada at the time of the incident upon which Plaintiff's claim
is based.

While Utah has some connection to the occurrence via
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some of the parties' domiciles, Nevada's relation to the parties,
as far as this occurrence is concerned, however, is equal to or
greater than Utah's relation, and it also favors the application
of Nevada law to this dispute.
iv.

The Parties' Relationship was Centered
Entirely in Nevada

Plaintiff and his employer began their relationship in
the State of Utah.

Some of the Subcontractors also began their

relationship with Layton in Utah.

Nevertheless, Steel Deck's

relationship with Plaintiff began, existed and ended in Nevada.
Steel Deck had no contact whatsoever with Plaintiff prior to the
arrival of both parties at the job site of the Nevada Project in
Ely, Nevada.

Because Steel Deck had no actual or constructive

knowledge of Plaintiff's existence until that point in time,
consideration of the place of the parties' relationship also
demonstrates that Nevada is the State with the greatest contacts
to and relationship with the occurrence and the parties involved
in this dispute.
B.
Analyzing and Comparing the Various Interests
of the Concerned Jurisdictions Demonstrates that
the Interests of Both Utah and Nevada Favor the
Application of the Immunity Provided by the Law of
Nevada
Some courts have rejected traditional contract and tort
choice of law principles "in favor of the rules traditionally
applied to workers' compensation conflicts cases."

Fox v.

Sharlow, 579 A.2d 603, 606-607 (Conn.Super. 1990); citing
Simaitis v. Flood. 437 A.2d 828 (Conn 1980).

In Wilson v. Faull,

141 A.2d 768 (N.J. 1958) the Supreme Court of New Jersey, ruling
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on a conflict between the workers' compensation laws of two
states which dealt differently with a plaintiff's right to
maintain a tort action stated:
[t]he classification of the plaintiff's claim as one
involving 'tort law' or 'contract law' or 'employment
relations law,' with the consequence that the court
need then only mechanically apply the respective choice
of law rule, i. e., the law of the state of the injury,
or the state where the employment contract was entered
into, or of the state with the most significant
contacts with the employment relation, does not in our
opinion provide a satisfactory choice of law rule where
the employee is not claiming compensation benefits but
is instead seeking to maintain a common law tort
action.
Id. at 774.
The New Jersey Supreme Court went on to hold that:
[c]hoice of law in the situation presented here should
not be governed by wholly fortuitous circumstances such
as where the injury occurred, or where the contract of
employment was executed, or where the parties resided
or maintained their places of business, or any
combination of these 'contacts.' Rather, it should be
founded on broader considerations of basic compensation
policy which the conflicting laws call into play, with
a view toward achieving a certainty of result and
effecting fairness between the parties within the
framework of that policy.
Id. at 778-779.
Other courts and authorities have adopted the reasoning
expressed in Wilson. See Larson, A. The Law of Workmen's
Compensation (1990) §§ 88.13 through 88.14, 16-185 through 16192.

Recently the New Jersey Supreme Court stated that the

"decision in Wilson, foreshadowed, if it did not fully comport
with, contemporary choice of law doctrine in which the
determinative law is that of the state with the greatest interest
in governing the particular issue.w
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Eaer v. E. T. Du Pont

DeNemours Co,, 539 A.2d 1213, 1217 (N.J. 1988).

See also

LaBountv, 451 A.2d at 164. In Braxton v. Anco Electric. Inc..
409 S.E.2d 914 (N.C. 1991), the Supreme Court of North Carolina
rejected the application of lex loci delicti to resolve a
conflict of laws regarding the exclusive remedy bar of two
states' workers' compensation statutes and applied the law of the
state whose interests it determined were paramount.

Id. at 916.

The Supreme Court of Massachusetts has also held that:
[i]n situations involving a conflict of laws
concerning the fellow employee's claimed
exemption from liability, the better reasoned
cases focus on the established relationship
of the parties, their expectations, and the
degree of interest of each jurisdiction whose
law might be applied.
Saharceski v. Marcure. 366 N.E.2d 1245, 1248 (Mass. 1977).
Many courts have elected to look to the interests of
involved jurisdictions to resolve conflicts of law in the
workers' compensation context.

If this court elects to utilize

an interests analysis approach the law which should be applied to
the case at bar will be the law of Nevada.
i.

Utah's Interests in Seeing its Residents
Compensated and Enabling its Citizens and
Residents to Continue to Seek and Receive Out
of State Work Favor the Application of Nevada
Law to Plaintiff's Complaint

There is no question that Utah has an interest in
seeing that its citizens are compensated for injuries they
receive regardless of where the injury may be sustained.
Cleveland v. U.S. Printing Ink. Inc., 588 A.2d 194 (Conn. 1991);
citing Simaitis, 437 A.2d at 832. The instant case, however,
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does not involve a choice between compensation or no compensation
for a Utah citizen.

Nor does it involve a right to supplemental

workers7 compensation payments as in Thomas v. Washington Gas
Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 100 S.Ct. 2647, 65 L.Ed.2d 757 (1980).
Plaintiff applied for and received his workers' compensation
payments and benefits pursuant to Utah law.

He is now seeking to

receive additional compensation by way of a third party tort
claim.

The majority of those employees injured in the course of

their employment cannot or choose not to seek more money by
initiating lawsuits.

In Bozo v. Central Coal & Coke Co.. 180

P.2d 432 (Utah 1919) this Court recognized that in many cases
workers' compensation payments and benefits are a sufficient
remedy.
Plaintiff contends that

lf

[h]is recovery from Workers

[sic] Compensation Fund of Utah has not been adequate to meet his
future needs" (R. 251) and that he needs and deserves an avenue
by which to recover additional compensation.

The legislature has

provided the State Industrial Commission with continuing
jurisdiction to modify awards and increase compensation when the
facts so merit.

Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-78 (1953 as amended).

Plaintiff could also seek additional benefits pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 35-1-70 (1953 as amended) or appeal the ruling or
order of the Industrial Commission pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S
35-1-82.53 (1953 as amended) in order to alleviate his claimed
problem of undercompensation.
Plaintiffs right to compensation has been honored.
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His medical bills, rehabilitation and training have been paid for
and Utah's interests in that regard have been satisfied.

The

State's interest in permitting Plaintiff to seek additional
compensation is dwarfed by its interest in ensuring his initial
recovery of workers' compensation and benefits.
A.2d at 164.

LaBounty, 451

Preventing Plaintiff from pursuing his cause of

action against these Defendants by applying Nevada law to this
dispute would only preclude him from trying to recover additional
compensation by way of a lawsuit.
Utah also has a valid and legitimate interest in
allowing workers' compensation insurance carriers and the
employer's of injured employees to seek subrogation from
responsible third parties.

Nevada also gives insurers and

employers a right to subrogate against responsible third parties.
Nevertheless, in its workers' compensation scheme co-employees
are exempt from liability for negligence.

Despite Utah's

interest in allowing subrogation claims to be brought the main
purpose of the workers' compensation laws is to ensure that
injured employees are taken care of.
compensation payments and benefits.

Plaintiff has received his
Utah's interest has been

partially satisfied and its interest in allowing Plaintiff to go
forward with his negligence action is fairly insignificant when
the other policy considerations are looked at.
Preventing Plaintiff from pursuing his negligence cause
of action by the application of Nevada law may somewhat reduce
his recovery.

Allowing Plaintiff's lawsuit to proceed, however,
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by applying Utah law to this situation would detrimentally impact
the ability of Utah citizens, contractors and subcontractors to
compete for, seek and receive work on out of state projects.
Applying Utah law to this situation would permit Utah residents
who are injured while employed outside of this state to subject
general contractors, subcontractors and their employees to a
negligence lawsuit in the courts of this state.

That risk would

not exist if no Utah residents contractors or subcontractors were
present on an out of state project.

Applying Utah law to the

instant case would create a great disincentive to hire or employ
residents or contractors of this state.

The risk of having to

answer a negligence lawsuit in Utah would exist for every
participant on an out of state project whenever a Utah contractor
or subcontractor was working on the job site.

In order to avoid

the risk of tort liability in a Utah courtroom/ owners of
projects as well as general contractors or others responsible for
letting contracts would systematically refuse to give contracts
or work to individuals or companies from this State.

See Howe v.

Diversified Builders. Inc.. 69 Cal.Rptr. 56,59 (Cal.App.2d 1968).
In order to resolve a conflict of law using an interest
analysis the interests of the forum must be considered.

Utah's

interest in seeing its citizen compensated has been mostly
satisfied through the workers' compensation law of this state.
The lesser State interest of permitting a citizen to pursue a
negligent tort claim would be slightly impaired if Nevada law is
applied to this dispute.

The impairment of that interest,
25

however, is minor when compared to the significant detriment to
Utah citizens, contractors and subcontractors that would result
if it is decided that Utah law should govern this dispute.

When

only Utah's interests are considered, public policy demands that
Nevada law govern this dispute.
ii.

Nevada's Interests In; Conduct Within its
Borders: Protection of Those Working and
Doing Business Within Its Boundaries And
Recognition of the Exclusive Remedy
Provisions of Its Workers Compensation Laws
Also Favor the Application of Nevada's Law to
the Dispute

Plaintiff contends "that Nevada has no legitimate
interest in preventing Utah from providing Shaw with a right of
action for damages against a third party..." (Plaintiff's Brief
at 14). That position reveals an extremely narrow vision of the
facts, circumstances, issues and policies at stake in this
controversy.

Nevada has a greater interest in the application of

its laws to the present lawsuit than any other state.

The State

of Nevada was the owner and overseer of the Nevada Project;
Nevada is a potential defendant in this lawsuit; because it was a
Nevada Union job it can be assumed that a significant number of
Nevada residents and subcontractors were employed to complete the
Nevada project; and the injury and actions at the heart of this
lawsuit occurred in Nevada:
The function of Workers Compensation Law in an
industrialized society is easy to understand in terms
of making physical losses suffered by employees a part
of the cost of operation to be borne not only by
injured individuals and their families but by the
employment enterprise as a whole, ultimately to be
passed on to its customers as part of the cost of the
product or service provided for their use.
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Leflar, R.; McDougall, L.; and Felix, R. American Conflicts Law
(4th ed.) § 158 p. 447.
Workers7 compensation laws also represent a quid pro
quo which bestows both benefits and detriments upon all parties
to the trade off.

See generally A. Larson The Law of Workmen's

Compensation § 88.00 et seq. 16-171 through 16-213; and
Restatement (Second) Conflicts of Law § § 180 through 185 pp 536
through 555. The employer must provide workers' compensation
insurance to pay for all work related injuries regardless of
fault.

In exchange for that benefit the employee surrenders his

right to pursue other remedies.

Wilson, 141 A.2d at 776.

Because of the quid pro quo in the present situation both Nevada
and Utah have an interest in seeing that the injured employee
receive compensation.

Nevertheless, when an injured employee

seeks to maintain a tort action against a party who has been
granted immunity by one of the state's laws requiring the
provision of workers' compensation protection, the law of the
state providing freedom from liability is generally applied.
Eger, 539 A.2d 1217; citing Wilson 141 A.2d at 774-775. To
ignore the exclusive remedy provision of one state workers'
compensation law would do violence to the quid pro quo of
workers' compensation.
Plaintiff may argue that only his employer provided him
with Workers' Compensation protection and therefore should be the
only entity that should be protected from liability.

The laws of

Nevada, however, require that the general contractor remain
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ultimately liable for payment of workers' compensation benefits.
Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 616.085 and 616.270.

In order to comply with

its obligation, the general contractor incurs a cost.

As a

result of that cost the employee receives a benefit, additional
protection for work related injuries.

Plaintiff may also argue

that the same trade off does not justify the extension of the
immunity provided by Nevada's Workers' Compensation Act to
subcontractors.

The costs to the general contractor, however,

are passed on to# and ultimately borne by, the subcontractors on
the job.

Furthermore, all the subcontractors on a job enter into

a similar quid pro quo.

All of the subcontractors and their

employees give up their right to sue any of their co-employees
and in return receive immunity from negligence lawsuits such as
Plaintiff's.

Allowing Plaintiff's lawsuit to continue would

modify Nevada's statutory scheme for providing protection to
employers and employees within its boundaries.

See Eger, 539

A.2d at 1219-1218.
In addition to maintaining the integrity of its own
workers' compensation laws Nevada has a vital and legitimate
interest in regulating injury causing conduct within its borders.
The United States Supreme Court held that:

"few matters could be

deemed more appropriately the concern of the state in which the
injury occurs or more completely within its power [than] the
bodily safety and economic protection of employees injured within
it."

Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Cmm'n. 306

U.S. 493, 59 S. Ct. 629, 83 L. Ed. 946 (1939).
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See also Hudson

317 P.2d and Wood 332 P.2d.
Nevada has exempted some out of state employees from
the provisions of its workers' compensation law.
S 616.260(1) (1986).

Nev. Rev. Stat.

The Nevada legislature, however, has

declared an express interest in regulating all employees from
within or without of the state on jobs where the total value
exceeds Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($250,000).

The

express waiver of that exemption is set forth in Nev. Rev. Stat.
§ 616.260(3).
$250,000.

The cost of the Nevada Project was several times

The contract between Plaintiff's employer and Layton

was for over One Million One Hundred Thousand Dollars
(1,100,000).

To infringe upon the express interests of Nevada

would not only create confusion it would violate principles of
comity.

See Jackett v. Los Angeles Department of Water and

Power. 771 P.2d 1074, 1076-1077 (Utah App. 1989).
Once it is determined that Nevada law should govern
this cause of action it becomes necessary to determine what
effect Nevada Law would have on plaintiff's Complaint.

In Meers

v. Hauahton Elevator. 701 P.2d 1006, 1007 (Nev. 1985) the Nevada
Supreme Court stated that •• [i]t is well established that
employees and persons in the same employ as a person injured in
the course of employment, are immune from liability under the
Nevada Industrial Insurance Act" (emphasis added).

Pursuant to

Nevada Rev. Stat. § 616.560 (1986) "a person 'in the same employ'
as a claimant is relieved from Common Law liability for damages
resulting from injuries entitled to compensation under the
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Workman's Compensation Statute.11

Watson v. G. C. Associates Ltd.

Partnership. 691 P.2d 416, 418 (Nev. 1984); citing Howard v.
Eighth J. Dist. Ct.. 640 P.2d 1320, 1321 (Nev. 1982); and
Araaonez v. Taylor Steel Co.. 462 P.2d 754, 755 (1969).

The

issue in the case at hand, therefore, is whether plaintiff and
defendant Steel Deck were Min the same employ" and therefore,
whether Steel Deck is protected by statute from plaintiffs
claim.

Pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 616.085 and 616.116

subcontractors, independent contractors and their employees are
all considered to be employees of the principal or general
contractor.

In Meers the Nevada Supreme Court specifically

recognized that "in the construction business, subcontractors and
independent contractors will invariably be held to be statutory
employees of the general contractor.

Meers, 701 P.2d at 1007.

In the case at hand Steel Deck and plaintiff were both performing
work under subcontract agreements in furtherance of Layton's
general construction contract of the Nevada Project.
co-employees pursuant to Nevada law.

They are

Nevada law shields Steel

Deck from liability for Plaintiff's injuries which are at the
heart of this action.

Plaintiff's claim against Steel Deck,

therefore, should be found to be barred by statute and the
decision of the trial court upheld.
CONCLUSION
The primary issue in this case is a conflict of
law.

In Utah lex loci delicti governs the substantive rights of

the parties while procedural issues are resolved pursuant to Utah
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law.

Because the conflict in question deals with the parties'

substantive rights the law of the place of the wrong should
apply.

Because plaintiff's injuries as well as the acts and or

omissions which allegedly caused those injuries all occurred in
Nevada the law of Nevada should govern the substantive rights of
the parties.
If this Court elects to pursue a new course for choice
of law in Utah, either by way of a Mmost significant contacts"
test or an "interest analysis" Nevada law should still govern
Plaintiff's Complaint.

The accident occurred in Nevada, the

injuries were incurred in Nevada, there are parties from various
domiciles involved in this matter and the relationship of all
involved was wholly centered in Nevada.

Taking the interests of

both jurisdictions into account the conclusion is the same. Utah
wants to see its residents compensated.

Plaintiff has been

compensated. Even though Plaintiff's recovery could be somewhat
diminished by the application of Nevada's law to this dispute the
burden upon all of the contractors, subcontractors and
individuals from Utah who seek work out of state is too great to
permit Plaintiff to maintain this action in the Courts of Utah.
Furthermore, Nevada has an expressed interest in those who work
and receive compensation within its boarders.

It has implemented

a comprehensive workers' compensation scheme to protect and
promote that interest.

If this Court refuses to acknowledge that

interest and applies Utah law to this dispute Nevada will be
severely prejudiced.
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According to Nevada law co-employees are free from
liability for injuries sustained by co-employees during the
course and scope of their employment.
were co-employees.

Plaintiff and Steel Deck

Plaintiff is now trying to recover in tort

for injuries he received on the job, allegedly as the result of
acts and/or omissions of Steel Deck's employees in furtherance of
its subcontract agreement for construction of the Nevada Project.
The claim that Plaintiff is attempting to bring is barred by
Nevada substantive law.

We, therefore respectfully submit that

the trial court was correct in its rulings and the lower court's
decision should be upheld.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

ftO™

dav of October,

1993.
SCALLEY & READING
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
Steel Deck Erectors, Inc.

Steven B. Smith

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that 2 copies of the foregoing Brief were
mailed first class mail, postage prepaid, this
October, 1993, to the following:
Steven B. Wall, Esq.
Cory B. Wall, Esq.
WALL & WALL
Attorneys for Plaintiff
9 Exchange Place, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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day of

Lee Henning, Esq.
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
Attorneys for Defendant - Layton Construction Co., Inc.
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

STEVEN B. SMITH, Esq.
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ADDENDUM

EXHIBIT "A"

any compensation due the employee which was awarded or accrued but for
which a check was not issued or delivered at the date of death of the employee
is payable to his dependents as defined in NRS 616.615. (1947, p. 592; 1955, p
71; 1979, p. 1055; 1983, p. 1880; 1985, p. 1434.)
Crom reference*. — AJ to execution* tnd
exemption*, tee NHS 21.010 to 21340. A* to
hocpitAJ lien* not valid against person coming

under the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act
tee NHS 106.590

OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL
The federal government, under the taxinf power, can garnish moneys payable
from the commission to its claimants in order

to recover delinquent
(5-1-1957).

taxes
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616,555. Compensation of nonresident alien dependents.
Payments to the consul general, vice consul general, consul or vice consul of
the nation of which any dependent of a deceased employee is a resident or
subject, or a representative of such consul general, vice consul general, congu]
or vice consul, of any compensation due under this chapter to any dependent
residing outside of the United States, any power of attorney to receive or
receipt for the same to the contrary notwithstanding, shall be as fill] a
discharge of the benefits or compensation payable under this chapter as if
payments were made directly to the beneficiary. (1947, p. 592; 1955, p. 71.)
616.560. Liability of third parties for damages; reduction of compensation; subrogation of insurer to employee's rights; ben on
proceeds of recovery; jury instructions.
1. When an employee coming under the provisions of this chapter receives
an injury for which compensation is payable under this chapter and which
injury was caused under circumstances creating a legal liability in some
person, other than the employer or a person in the same employ, to pay
damages in respect thereof:
(a) The injured employee, or in case of death, his dependents, may take
proceedings against that person to recover damages, but the amount of the
compensation to which the injured employee or his dependents are entitled
under this chapter, including any future compensation under this chapter,
must be reduced by the amount of the damages recovered, notwithstanding
any act or omission of the employer or a person in the same employ which
was a direct or proximate cause of the employee's injury.
(b) If the injured employee, or in case of death his dependents, receive
compensation under this chapter, the insurer has a right of action against
the person so liable to pay damages and is subrogated to the rights of the
injured employee or of his dependents to recover therefor. In any action or
proceedings taken by the insurer under this section evidence of the amount
of compensation, accident benefits and other expenditures which the
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insurer has paid or become obligated to pay by reason of the injury or death
of the employee is admissible. If in such action or proceedings the insurer
recovers more than the amounts it has paid or become obligated to pay as
compensation, the excess must be paid to the injured employee or his
dependents.
(c) The iryured employee, or in case of death his dependents, shall first
notify the insurer in writing of any action or proceedings, pursuant to this
section, to be taken by the employee or his dependents.
2. In any case where the insurer is subrogated to the rights of the injured
employee or of his dependents as provided in subsection 1, the insurer has a
lien upon the total proceeds of any recovery from some person other than the
employer, whether the proceeds of such recovery are by way of judgment,
settlement or otherwise. The iiyured employee, or in the case of his death his
dependents, are not entitled to double recovery for the same injury,
notwithstanding any act or omission of the employer or a person in the same
employ which was a direct or proximate cause of the employee's injury.
3. The lien provided for under subsection 2 includes the total compensation
expenditure incurred by the insurer for the injured employee and his
dependents.
4. Within 15 days of the date of recovery by way of actual receipt of the
proceeds of the judgment, settlement or otherwise, the iryured employee or his
representative shall notify the insurer of such recovery and pay to the insurer
the amount due under this section together with an itemized statement
showing the distribution of the total recovery
5. In any trial of an action by the injured employee, or in the case of his
death by his dependents, against a person other than the employer or a person
in the same employ, the jury shall receive proof of the amount of all payments
made or to be made by the insurer The court shall instruct the jury
substantially as follows
(a) "Payment of workmen's compensation benefit* by the insurer is based
upon the fact that a compensable industrial accident occurred, and does not
depend upon blame or fault If the plaintiff does not obtain a judgment in
his favor in this case, he is not required to repay his employer or the insurer
any amount paid to him or paid on his behalf by his employer or by the
insurer"; and
(b> "If you decide that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the
defendant, you shall find his damages in accordance with the court's
instructions on damages and return your verdict in the plaintiffs favor in
the amount so found without deducting the amount of any compensation
benefits paid to or for the plaintiff The law provides a means by which any
compensation benefits will be repaid from your award " (1947, p 595; 1949,
p 659; CL 1929 (1949 Supp ), § 2680.75,1957, p 519; 1973, p. 498,1977, pp.
216, 424; 1979, p. 1055; 1981, p 1491.)
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EXHIBIT "B"

616.083

INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE

616.085

entitled to the benefits of this chapter < 1971. p. 249: 1973, p. 1580; 1981, p.
487; 1985, p. 576.)
616.083. "Employee**: Trainees in facility operated by rehabilitation division of department of human resources.
Trainees in a rehabilitation facility operated by the rehabilitation division
of the department of human resources, while engaged in an evaluation or
training program and while acting under the direction or authorization of the
rehabilitation division of the department of human resources in any county,
city or town, shall be deemed, for the purpose of this chapter, employees of the
rehabilitation division of the department of human resources receiving a wage
of $200 per month, and shall be entitled to the benefits of this chapter upon
compliance by the rehabilitation division of the department of human resources. (1965, p. 92; 1967, p. 832; 1973, p. 1406.)
Cross references. — As to determination of
disability for vocational rehabilitation, see
NRS 615.220.

616.084. "Employee": Volunteer workers at facilities for inpatients of
mental hygiene and mental retardation division of department of human resources.
Volunteer workers at a facility for inpatients of the mental hygiene and
mental retardation division of the department of human resources, while acting under the direction or authorization of the supervisor of volunteer services
of such a facility, shall be deemed, for the purpose of this chapter, employees
of the facility, receiving a wage of $350 per month, and are entitled to the
benefits of this chapter upon compliance therewith by the facility. (1969, p.
236; 1973, pp. 118, 1406; 1987, ch. 397, § 2, p. 921.)
Cross references. — As to labor by clients
of mental health centers, see NRS 433.524.

616.085. "Employee": Subcontractors and employees.
1. Except as otherwise provided in NRS 616.262, subcontractors, independent contractors and the employees of either shall be deemed to be employees
of the principal contractor for the purposes of this chapter.
2. If the subcontractor is a sole proprietor or partnership licensed pursuant
to chapter 624 of NRS, the sole proprietor or partner shall be deemed to
receive a wage of $500 per month for the purposes of this chapter.
3. This section does not affect the relationship between a principal contractor and a subcontractor or independent contractor for any purpose outside the
scope of this chapter. (1947, p. 571; 1951. p. 485; 1987, ch. 771, § 3, p. 2047;
1991, ch. 723, § 42, p. 2399.)
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EXHIBIT "C"

616.270

LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL IELATTOHS

616.270

61&270. E m p l o y e r s to provide compensation; relief from HibOity*
1. Every employer within the provisions of this chapter, end those
employers who shall accept the terms of this chapter and be governed by its
provisions, as in this chapter provided, shall provide and secure compensation
according to the terms, conditions and provisions of this chapter for any and
all persona] injuries by accident sustained by an employee arising out of and
in the course of the employment.
2. Travel for which an employee receives wages shall, for the purposes of
this chapter, be deemed in the course of employment
3. In such cases the employer shall be relieved from other liability for
recovery of damages or other compensation for such personal iiyury, unless by
the terms of this chapter otherwise provided. (TJ&Zo^ 57Zt£L-W2$HtS?9\

CASE NOTES
I
II
III
IV.

General Consideration
Injury Arising Out of and In Course di Employment
Exclusivity of Act
Provision of Coverage by Employer
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

CH*d in: Simon Serv lnc v Mitchell. 73
Nev 9.307P.2d 110 < 1957». Tab Constr Co v
Eighth Judicial Dial Court. 83 Nev 364 432
P 2d 90 11967». Heiunan v Bank o( Las Vegas
87 Nev 201. 484 P 2d 572 <1971\* Nevada
Indus Commn v Reese. 93 Ne\ 115.560 P 2d
1352 11977 K Spencer v Harrah s lnc . 98 Ne\
99. 641 P2d 481 (1982'. Lewis v United
States. 680 F 2d 68 <9th Cir 1982
II INJURY ARISING OLT OF AND IN
COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT
Nefbgence of felJom employee. — When
an employee is injured on the job a* a result of
the negligence of a fellom employee, hi* rem
edv is compensation under the Nevada Indus
trial Insurance Act Leslie v J A Tiberu
Constr Co . 99 Nex 494 664 P 2d 963 < 1983
Assault while at work — Where an em
ployee is assaulted and injury is inflicted upon
him through ammosit> and ill will ansinf
from some cause wholly disconnected with the
employers business or the employment the
employee cannot recover compensation simpl>
because he is assaulted when he is in the
discharge of his duties Under such circum
stances, the injury does not arise out of the
course of employment, and the emplo>ment is
not the cause of the injury. although it may be
the occasion of the willful act and may furnish
the opportunity for its execution McColl v
Scherer, 73 Nev 226, 315 P.2d 807*1957).

Assault by insane coem ployee. — Employee's death, as a matter of law, arose out of
the employment, where be was assaulted in
the course of his employment by an insane
fellow emplovee Cumnung* ? United Reaon
Hotels, lnc . 85 Nev 23. 449 P.2d 245 (1969Shooting of employee. — In a personal
injury action brought against a club owner by
s WSJtress who was shot by a customer while
on dut\ summary judgment for the employer
on grounds that she was covered by the Industrial Insurance Act was improper, where there
was no determination as to whether her injury
resulted from being placed in a position of
dMngtr by reason of her employment or was the
result of enmity, fmdgt. or other personal
relationship McColl v Scherer. 73 Nev 226.
315 P 2d 807 < 1957,
Recreational activity. — Recreational ac
tivity should not be deemed to be within the
course of employment unless it is s regular
incident of employment, or is required by the
employer, or is of direct benefit to the employer
beyond the intangible value of employee
health and morale common to all kinds of
recreation and social life. thus, where it was
not a regular incident of employee's employ
ment to enjov recreation on his day off at golf
driving range, and his employer did not require his presence there, nor did the employer
receive a direct benefit from that off-duty
activity beyond the intangible value of employee health and morale common to all kinds
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EXHIBIT "D"

35-1-62

LABOR — INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

35-1-62. Injuries or death caused by wrongful acts of persons other than employer, officer, agent, or employee of said employer — Rights of employer or
insurance carrier in cause of action — Maintenance of action — Notice of intention to proceed
against third party — Right to maintain action
not involving employee-employer relationship —
Disbursement of proceeds of recovery.
When any injury or death for which compensation is payable under this
title shall have been caused by the wrongful act or neglect of a person other
than an employer, officer, agent, or employee of said employer, the injured
employee, or in case of death his dependents, may claim compensation and the
injured employee or his heirs or personal representative may also have an
action for damages against such third person. If compensation is claimed and
the employer or insurance carrier becomes obligated to pay compensation, the
employer or insurance carrier shall become trustee of the cause of action
against the third party and may bring and maintain the action either in its
own name or in the name of the injured employee, or his heirs or the personal
representative of the deceased, provided the employer or carrier may not
settle and release the cause of action without the consent of the commission.
Before proceeding against the third party, the injured employee, or, in case of
death, his heirs, shall give written notice of such intention to the carrier or
other person obligated for the compensation payments, in order to give such
person a reasonable opportunity to enter an appearance in the proceeding.
For the purposes of this section and notwithstanding the provisions of Section 35-1-42, the injured employee or his heirs or personal representative may
also maintain an action for damages against subcontractors, general contractors, independent contractors, property owners or their lessees or assigns, not
occupying an employee-employer relationship with the injured or deceased
employee at the time of his injury or death.
If any recovery is obtained against such third person it shall be disbursed as
follows:
(1) The reasonable expense of the action, including attorneys' fees,
shall be paid and charged proportionately against the parties as their
interests may appear. Any such fee chargeable to the employer or carrier
is to be a credit upon any fee payable by the injured employee or, in the
case of death, by the dependents, for any recovery had against the third
party.
(2) The person liable for compensation payments shall be reimbursed
in full for all payments made less the proportionate share of costs and
attorneys' fees provided for in Subsection (1).
(3) The balance shall be paid to the injured employee or his heirs in
case of death, to be applied to reduce or satisfy in full any obligation
thereafter accruing against the person liable for compensation.
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 72; C.L. 1917,
§ 3133; L. 1921, ch. 100, § 1; R.S. 1933,
42-1-58; L. 1939, ch. 51, § 1; C. 1943, 42-1-58;

L. 1945, ch. 65, § 1; 1971, ch. 76, § 3; 1973,
ch. 67, § 7; 1975, ch. 101, § 3.
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EXHIBIT "E"

35-1-54

LABOR -

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

35-1-54- Employee injured outside state — Entitled to compensation — Limitation of time.
If an employee who has been hired or is regularly employed in this state
receives personal injury by accident arising out of and m the course of such
employment outside of this state, he, or his dependents in case of his death
shall be entitled to compensation according to the law of this state. This
provision shall apply only to those injuries received by the employee within
six months after leaving this state, Unless prior to the expiration of such six
months period the employer has filed with the Industrial Commission of Utah
notice that he has elected to extend such coverage a greater period of time.
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 65; C.L. 1917,
§ 3126; R.S. 1933, 42-1-52; L. 1941, ch. 37,
§ 1; C. 1943, 42-1-52.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Employees of foreign corporation
Foreign compensation Jaws
Injuries in interstate commerce.
Operation and effect
Words and phrases defined
Cited
Employees of foreign corporation.
Since relation of employer and employee existed between foreign transportation company
and truck driver in this state at time of injury,
Industrial Commission had jurisdiction to
make award, and such power in nowise depended upon reading into his contract of employment the law of Colorado where the contract was made, for when employer sent his
employee into Utah to work for it there, it subjected itself to this chapter Buckingham
Transp Co v Industrial Comm'n, 93 Utah
342, 72 P2d 1077 (1937)
Employer or its insurance earner are not required to make payments to injury benefit fund
where airline stewardess, employed in California by employer with its principal offices in
California, is killed in course of temporary employment in Utah leaving no surviving dependents United Air Lines Transp Corp v Industna) Comm'x, JJD Utah 590, J75 P2d 152
(1946)
Foreign compensation laws.
In action by employee for personal injuries
arising in state of Wyoming, defense that Wyoming had adopted Workmen's Compensation
Act, and that such act furnished adequate and
exclusive remedy to employee to recover compensation, was sustained Bozo v Central Coal
& Coke Co , 54 Utah 289, 180 P 432 (1919)
Resident employee who was injured in

course of employment in another state was entitled to compensation for such injuries, although employer was insured under lawB of
other state Pickenngv Industrial Comm'n, 59
Utah 35, 201 P 1029 (1921)
In the absence of proof it will be presumed
that the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act of another state are the same at
those of the forum ShurthfT v Oregon Short
Line RR, 66 Utah 161, 241 P 1058 (1925X
Injuries in interstate commerce.
Industrial Commission had power to maka
award under this section for injury to trucker
employed by foreign corporation under foreign
contract notwithstanding that trucker was ia
interstate commerce when injured Buckingham Transp Co v Industnal Comm'n, 93
Utah 342, 72 P 2d 1077 (1937)
Operation and effect.
If employer-employee relationship is maiatained in this state, Industrial Commission hat
jurisdiction to make an award notwithstanding
that original contract of employment was ear
tered into in foreign state and that injury ee*
curred in foreign state Fay v Industrial
Comm'n, 100 Utah 542, 114 P 2d 508 (19411,
Commission had right to award compenan*
tion for death of salesman occurring m Idaht*
under first sentence of this section, nolwtth*
standing that original contract of employmeafc
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EXHIBIT "F"

WORKERS' COMPENSATION
Educ of Alpine School Dist. v Olsen, 684 P.2d
49 (Utah 1984).
. .
Welfare or relief recipients.
Under voluntary arrangement between two
^
. 1 r
j LI
A
state agencies, state fair association and public
welfare department, pursuant to fetter's plan
Jo compel welfare recipients who were able to
work to work out their relief payments on certain projects, whereby such recipients were directed to report to association for work and
were placed by latter under supervision and
control of its superintendent of fairgrounds at
work having substantial economic value to as-

35-1-44

sociation, recipient was "employee,*' association was "employer" and "contract of hire" existed within meaning of this section, as
amended m 1945, so as to entitle injured recip. .
.
,
*
lent to compensation, where association was
, ,
,r
„ c
L
r mred
^
* y w e l f a r e " J ™ * ™ *> f u r n i s ^
compensation insurance for such workers, and
had
"ght to *"». fire> c o n t r o l > supervise and
regulate pay of them, although payment of
compensation and relief payments were made
by welfare board. Commission of Fin. v. Industrial Comm'n, 113 Utah 73, 191 P.2d 598
(1948).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 99 CJ.S. Workmen's Compensation § 59 et seq.

Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation
•= 230.

35-1-44. Definition of terms.
The following terms as used in this title shall be construed as follows:
(1) "Order" shall mean and include any decision, rule, regulation, direction, requirement or standard of the commission, or any other determination arrived at, or decision made, by such commission.
(2) "General order" shall mean and include an order applying generally throughout the state to all persons, employments or places of employment of a class under the jurisdiction of the commission. All other orders
of the commission shall be considered special orders.
(3) "Welfare" shall mean and include comfort, decency and moral wellbeing.
(4) "Safe" and "safety," as applied to any employment or place of employment, shall mean such freedom from danger to the life, health or
welfare of employees as the nature of the employment will reasonably
permit.
(5) "Personal injury by accident arising out of or in the course of employment" shall include any injury caused by the willful act of a third
person directed against an employee because of his employment. It shall
not include a disease, except as it shall result from the injury.
(6) "Compensation" shall mean the payments and benefits provided for
in this title.
(7) "Award" shall mean the finding or decision of the commission as to
the amount of compensation due any injured, or the dependents of any
deceased, employee.
(8) "Average weekly earnings" shall mean the average weekly earnings arrived at by the rules provided in Section 35-1-75.
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 52; C.L. 1917,
I 3112; L. 1921, ch. 67, § 1; R.S. 1933 & C.
1*43, 42-1-42.
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EXHIBIT "G"

616.255

INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE

616 260

SCOPE AND OPERATION

616.255. Applicability to interstate commerce and certain plans for
benefits in effect before July 1, 1947.
LEGAL PERIODICALS
Review of Selected Nevada Legislation,
Health and Welfare. 1987 Pac L J Rev Nev
Legis 117.

616.256. Plans for benefits in effect before July 1, 1947: Determination
of sufficiency; applicability of chapter.
LEGAL PERIODICALS
Review of Selected Nevada Legislation,
Health and Welfare, 1987 Pac L J Rev Nev
Legis 117

616.260. Exemption of employer and employee temporarily within
state; exception; effect of employee working in another
state where coverage required.
/ 1. Except as limited in subsection 3, any emDlovee who has been hired
I outside of this state and his employer are exempted from the provisions of this
j chapter while the employee is temporarily within this state doing work for his
I emplover if his employer has furnished industrial insurance coverage under
t the industrial insurance act or similar laws of a state other than Nevada so as
i^to cover the emDlovee s employment while in tms state, proviaec
(a) The extraterritorial provisions of this chapter are recognized in the
^^other state, and
/
(b) Employers and employees who are covered in this state are iiKewise
/ exempted from the application of the industrial insurance act or similar
Inlaws of the other state.
The benefits under the industrial insurance act or similar laws of the other
state are the exclusive remedy aeainst the emplover for any lniury. wnetner
resulting in death or not, received by the employee while working for trie
employer in this state.
2. A certificate from the administrator or similar officer of another state
certifying that the emDloyer of the other state is insured therein and has
provided extraterritorial coverage insuring his emDlovees while working
withm this state is prima facie evidence that the employer carried the maustrial insurance.
3. The exemption provided for in this section does not apply to the employees of a contractor, as defined in NRS 624.020, operating withm the scope
l^j>f his license on a project whose cost as a whole exceeds S250,000
4. An employer is not required to pay premiums to the system for an employee who has been hired or is regularly employed in this state, but who is

r
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616.263

LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATK

616.265

performing work exclusively in another state, if the otr.er state requires the
employer to provide coverage for the employee in the otner state If the employee receives personal injury by accident ansins: out of ana m the course of
his employment, any claim for compensation must be filed in the state m
which the accident occurred, and such compensation is the exclusive remedy
of the employee or his dependents. This subsection does not prevent an employer from maintaining coverage for the employee under the provisions of
this chapter. (1947, p. 594, 1955, p. 187: 1981, p. 1464. 1989. ch. 276, § 1, p.
578; 1989, ch. 325, § 1, p. 682.)
Editor's note. — This section was amended
by two 1989 acts which do not appear to conflict and have been compiled together
Effective date. — Acts 1989, ch 276. § 1
became effective October 1 1989 Acts 1989
ch 325 ^ 1 became effective June 13, 1989
pursuant to ch 325 } 2
Effect of amendment. — The 1989 amend-

ment by ch 276. § 1. as amended bv ch 325,
§ 1, in the introductory paragraph of subsection 1, added "ExceDt as limited in subsection
3" at the beginning of the DaraeraDh added
the present subdivision Kai ano redesignated
the rormer subdivisions Itai and Kb) as the
present subdivisions Kb) and l(o. resDectively,
and added suosections 3 and 4

616.263. Real estate broker or salesman who hires independent contractor not considered employer.
Any person licensed pursuant to the provisions of chaDter 645 of NRS who
engages an independent contractor to maintain or reoair DroDertv on Denaif of
an individual property owner or an association oi proDerxy owners is not a
statutory employer for the purposes of this cnamer * 19b7. en 199 $ 4, p
450 )
LEGAL PERIODICALS
Review oi Selected Nevada Legislation
WorKers Compensation, 19&7 Pac LJ Re\
Nev Legis 219

616.265. Devices modifying liability void; exception.
1. Except as otherwise provided in suosection 1
(a) A contract of employment, insurance, relief benefit, indemnity, or any
other device, does not modif\, change or waive any liability created by this
chapter.
(b) A contract of employment, insurance, relief benefit, indemnity, or any
other device, having for its purpose the waiver or modification of the terms
or liability created by this chapter is void
2. Nothing in this section prevents an owner or lessor of real property from
requiring an employer \sho is leasing the real property from agreeing to insure the owner or lessor of the property against any liability for repair or
maintenance of the premises (1947, p. 572, CL 1929 11949 Supp ), § 2680.25
1989, ch. 5S2, & 1, p 1245 )
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